

1/13/16 3:52 PM

- I. Prologue
- II. The Bomb & I
- III. RAND
- IV. Pacific Command & Control
- V. Delegation
- VI. Iwakuni I
- VII. PACOM War Plan
- VIII. JSCP
- IX. Briefing Bundy
- X. Delegation II
- XI. Iwakuni II
- XII. Gilpatric: Questions on JSCP
- XIII. How Many Will Die?
- XIV. The Missile Gap/Berlin
- XV. Delegation III
- XVI. Delegation IV: The Fifty Year Cover Up
- XVII. Delegation V: The Strangelove Paradox
- XVIII. Helping End the War

Strategic bombing/Tokyo/Hiroshima and Seamless Progression Into Early War Planning

First-Use Threats & Relation to First-Strike Planning

Athens/Ann Arbor

Cuban Missile Crisis

Schlesinger/Ford/Carter, Towards a New Cold War (building on earlier plans): The Construction of Instability

Towards 1983 Crisis, 1995

First-Use Threats Right up to the Present (Iran, Ukraine)

Presumption of Preemptive Advantage Vs. Nuclear Winter/50 Year Delusion

Doomsday Postures and Modernization Preclude Effective Anti-Proliferation

1/13/16 3:52 PM

- I. Prologue
- II. Strategic Bombing
- III. The Bomb & I
- IV. RAND, Decision-Making, & Fears of A Soviet First-Strike
- V. Pacific Command & Control
- VI. Delegation
- VII. Iwakuni I
- VIII. PACOM War Plan
- IX. JSCP
- X. Briefing Bundy
- XI. Delegation II
- XII. Iwakuni II
- XIII. Gilpatric: Questions on JSCP
- XIV. How Many Will Die?
- XV. The Missile Gap/Berlin & the Gilpatric Speech
- XVI. Athens/Ann Arbor & First-Use/First-Strike Threats
- XVII. The Cuban Missile Crisis
- XVIII. Delegation III
- XIX. Delegation IV: The Fifty Year Cover Up
- XX. Delegation V: The Strangelove Paradox
- XXI. Helping End the War
- XXII. The Construction of Instability: First-Use Threats & the Risks of Nuclear War
- XXIII. Fears of a First-Strike: The Soviet-American War Scares & (the Secret Nuclear Crisis/Most Dangerous Moment Since the Cuban Missile Crisis,) 1983
- XXIV. Cooperative Security and the End of the Cold War
- XXV. Renewing the Arms Race in the New Cold War: First-Use Threats & the Risks of Nuclear War in the 21st Century
- XXVI. Thinking the Unthinkable: First-Use and First-Strike Preemptive Postures vs. Nuclear Winter (or The Fifty Year Delusion)
- XXVII. Ending the New Arms Race & Dismantling the Doomsday Machines

Strategic bombing/Tokyo/Hiroshima and Seamless Progression Into Early War Planning

First-Use Threats & Relation to First-Strike Planning

Athens/Ann Arbor

Cuban Missile Crisis

Schlesinger/Ford/Carter, Towards a New Cold War (building on earlier plans): The Construction of Instability

Towards 1983 Crisis, 1995

First-Use Threats Right up to the Present (Iran, Ukraine)

Presumption of Preemptive Advantage Vs. Nuclear Winter/50 Year Delusion

Doomsday Postures and Modernization Preclude Effective Anti-Proliferation

1/13/16 3:52 PM

- I. Prologue
- II. Strategic Bombing
- III. The Bomb & I
- IV. RAND, Decision-Making, & Fears of A Soviet First-Strike
- V. Pacific Command & Control
- VI. Delegation I
- VII. Iwakuni I
- VIII. PACOM War Plan
- IX. JSCP
- X. Briefing Bundy
- XI. Delegation II: "A White House/DOD Committee of One"
- XII. Iwakuni II
- XIII. Gilpatric: Questions on JSCP
- XIV. How Many Will Die?
- XV. The Missile Gap/Berlin
- XVI. Athens/Ann Arbor & First-Use/First-Strike Threats
- XVII. The Cuban Missile Crisis
- XVIII. Delegation III: LBJ
- XIX. Delegation IV: The Fifty Year Cover Up
- XX. Delegation V: The Strangelove Paradox
- XXI. (Helping End the War)
- XXII. The Construction of Instability: First-Use Threats & the Risks of Nuclear War
- XXIII. Fears of a First-Strike: The Soviet-American War Scares & (the Secret Nuclear Crisis/Most Dangerous Moment Since the Cuban Missile Crisis,) 1983
- XXIV. Cooperative Security and the End of the Cold War
- XXV. Renewing the Arms Race in the New Cold War: First-Use Threats & the Risks of Nuclear War in the 21st Century
- XXVI. Thinking the Unthinkable: First-Use and First-Strike Preemptive Postures vs. Nuclear Winter (or The Fifty Year Delusion)
- XXVII. Ending the New Arms Race & Dismantling the Doomsday Machines